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This Article revisits and refines the organizing principles of evidence law:
case specificity, cost minimization, and equal best. These three principles
explain and justify all admissibility and sufficiency requirements of the law
of evidence. The case-specificity principle requires that factfinders base their
decisions on the relative plausibility of the stories describing the parties’
entitlement–accountability relationship. The cost-minimization principle
demands that factfinders minimize the cost of errors and the cost of avoiding
errors as a total sum. The equal-best principle mandates that factfinders
afford every person the maximal feasible protection against risk of error
while equalizing that protection across the board.
This Article connects these principles to the irreducibly second-personal
structure of legal doctrine (that tracks Stephen Darwall’s celebrated account
of morally justified claims). Under this structure, the plaintiff ’s (or the
prosecutor’s) authority to extract compensation from (or impose punishment
on) the defendant critically depends on the trustworthiness of the individual
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infringement allegations that make the defendant accountable to the plaintiff
(or the prosecutor). Evidentiary rules fit into this second-personal
framework only when they promote case specificity, cost minimization, or
equal best. Reform proposals that favor different rules are fatally
disconnected from that framework and are therefore ill-conceived.
Based on this observation, I criticize three powerful accounts of evidence
law that rely, respectively, on economics, probability theory, and morality.
These accounts include Louis Kaplow’s theory of the burden of proof, Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s claim that factfinders’ deviations from
mathematical probability are irrational, and Ronald Dworkin’s distinction
between accidentally and deliberately imposed risks of error. These accounts
break away from our second-personal system of entitlements and liabilities;
by doing so, they create a methodologically impermissible disconnect between
rules of evidence and substantive laws.
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INTRODUCTION
Throughout the twentieth century, the realist theories of law came to
occupy a dominant position in contemporary jurisprudence. Those theories
are diverse. Yet, all of them coalesce around a robust proposition that denies
the existence of distinctly legal reasoning. According to those theories,
reasoning that takes place in courts of law is not “legal” in any distinctive
sense. Rather, it consists of moral, political, economic, epistemic, and
psychological claims. These claims are pursued by litigants and subsequently
validated or rejected by courts. Formally, they allude to applicable legal
rules and the underlying facts, but the actual meaning of those rules and
facts is determined by reasons that are external to the law. The reasons that
actually determine what the applicable rules say and what the underlying
facts are come from morality, politics, economics, epistemology, and
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psychology. They use legal vocabulary but do not derive from the law.
Consequently, so goes the argument, law cannot be considered a selfcontained practice and autonomous discipline. As some uncompromising
Realists and critical legal scholars put it, “law is an empty vessel.”1
In the pages ahead, I set forth and explain my profound disagreement
with this argument. Realists correctly perceive law as a combined product of
moral, political, economic, epistemic, and other societally relevant ideas.
These ideas are vital for all forms of social organization, including law. Prior
to going into law, however, these ideas undergo selection, adjustment, and
integration by the lawmaker: the legislature or a superior common law
court. The lawmaker uses these ideas to formulate its goals and to devise
rules that realize those goals. As part of that process, it adopts certain ideas
while leaving other ideas out. The lawmaker then integrates the selected
ideas and writes them into rules that regulate primary activities,
adjudication, and courts’ decisions.
This process of selection, adjustment, and integration is guided by the
lawmaker’s reasons.2 These reasons are distinctively “legal” because they
perform a critical organizing role in determining the contents of the legal
system.3 They select the moral, economic, epistemic, and other socially
relevant ideas that go into the law and translate them into rules.4 In what
follows, I identify these reasons as “organizing principles.”
Organizing principles lie at the heart of the “New Doctrinalism”—
theorizing about the actual practice of the law, which is predominantly
doctrinal.5 Full explication of these principles’ characteristics requires an
extensive philosophical investigation, which I cannot carry out in this
Article. The conveners of this Symposium asked me to explore the
relationship between the New Doctrinalism and the law of evidence, and I
now begin this exploration.
This Article proceeds in the following order. In Part I, I outline the
organizing principles of evidence law, explain their connection to specific
evidentiary rules and substantive law, and identify the constraints they
impose on normative theories of evidence. In Parts II, III, and IV, I criticize
economic, probabilistic, and moral theories of evidence that proceed in
1 ANDREW A LTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE 90 (1990)
(noting that some critical legal scholars perceive legal rules as “‘empty vessels’ into which
individuals can pour virtually any content they please”).
2 See SCOTT J. S HAPIRO, LEGALITY 119-21, 149 (2011) (identifying lawmakers’ rules and
reasons as “plans”).
3 Id. at 225-30 (explaining why plans underlying lawmaker’s rules are distinctly “legal”).
4 Id. at 231-33.
5 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreword, 163 U. PA. L. R EV. 1843 (2015).
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isolation from those principles and ignore the constraints they impose. A
short Conclusion follows.
I. ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
In the paragraphs ahead, I identify three organizing principles of
evidence law.6 These principles originate from epistemology, economics,
and morality. The first and most fundamental of the three is epistemic: it
requires that courts decide cases on the basis of case-specific evidence, as
opposed to generalizations and statistical distributions.7 The second
principle is economic: it requires that court procedures and decisions
minimize, simultaneously, the cost of error in factfinding and the cost of
avoiding that error.8 The third principle is moral: it requires that courts
afford every person the maximal feasible protection against adjudicative
error and that this protection be equal for all parties in civil trials and across
all criminal defendants (“equal best”).9
These principles explain and justify the existing allocation of the
burdens of proof, admissibility rules, and corroboration requirements. All
evidentiary rules, except privileges, are geared toward accomplishing case
specificity, cost minimization, and equal best.10 My book, Foundations of
Evidence Law, unfolds this interpretive claim.11 In this Article, I focus on
the principles themselves while trying to refine and further develop my
earlier account. Specifically, I explain how these principles integrate with
substantive entitlements and liabilities and how they limit normative claims
with respect to the law of evidence.
The facts underlying legal disputes are inherently uncertain and courts
consequently never know exactly what they are.12 Therefore, instead of
trying to find the actual facts, courts determine what these facts are likely to
be under conditions of uncertainty.13 The rules, known as the law of
evidence, help courts make these determinations. These rules categorize

6 This discussion refines and further develops the ideas presented in my book, ALEX S TEIN,
FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW (2005) [hereinafter FOUNDATIONS].
7 See id. at 91-106 (identifying the maximal individualization requirement).
8 See id. at 141-43 (specifying the cost-efficiency requirement).
9 See id. at 172-78, 214-25 (identifying the “equal best” requirement for factfinding in criminal
and civil cases).
10 Id. at 91-106, 143-67, 178-208, 225-44.
11 Id. at ix-xiii, 133-40.
12 Id. at 34-36.
13 Id.
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evidence as admissible or inadmissible.14 They also require corroboration for
certain types of evidence and determine the burdens and standards of proof
for factual findings.15 By doing all that, evidentiary rules allocate the risk of
error—and the ensuing prospect of wrongful punishment, dispossession,
deprivation, or denial of remedy—to one party or another.16
Allocation of error brings probability theory, economics, and moral
philosophy into play. Arguably, evidence doctrine must ensure that courts’
decisions are aligned with the canons of probability17 and satisfy the
demands of both fairness and welfare maximization.18 Evidence doctrine,
however, steers away from probabilistic calculus19 and direct welfare
maximization;20 it is also far removed from the fairness ideas recommended
by moral philosophers. For these reasons, it has been criticized for
being economically ignorant,21 probabilistically irrational,22 and morally
deficient.23 These critiques come exclusively from academic corners and
they do not sit well with the actual practice of the law. Attorneys and judges
do not perceive evidence doctrine as wicked or misguided.24
14 See GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 1 (3d ed. 2013) (“Evidence law is about the limits we
place on the information juries hear.”).
15 See Alex Stein, Inefficient Evidence, 66 ALA. L. REV. 423, 443 & n.84 (2015).
16 FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 133-38.
17 For a discussion of this claim, see WILLIAM TWINING & ALEX S TEIN, EVIDENCE AND
PROOF, at xxi-xxiv (William L. Twining & Alex Stein eds., 1992).
18 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 757-58 (8th ed.
2011) (positing that minimization of the aggregate cost of errors and error avoidance is a
fundamental economic goal of procedural law); Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738
(2012) (arguing that evidentiary rules should be reconfigured to incentivize socially optimal
primary behavior); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1477 (1999) (arguing that evidence law should enhance social welfare through minimization
of the total cost of error and error avoidance).
19 See Alex Stein, Of Two Wrongs That Make a Right: Two Paradoxes of the Evidence Law and
Their Combined Economic Justification, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1199, 1204 & n.6, 1205 (2001) (evaluating
the current state of evidence law in which the burden of proof must be met on each element of a
claim as opposed to a statistical analysis of the overall probability based on the multiplication
principle). For an argument to the contrary and criticism leveled against it, compare Edward K.
Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 YALE L.J. 1254 (2013), with Ronald J. Allen &
Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 557 (2013).
20 Allen & Stein, supra note 19, at 588-93.
21 See infra Part II.
22 See infra Part III.
23 See infra Part IV.
24 See, e.g., Sidney A. Fitzwater, Opening Remarks, The Restyled Federal Rules of Evidence, 53
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1437, 1442 (2012) (“Rule 102 captures the purpose of the Federal Rules of
Evidence: ‘These rules should be construed so as to administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate
unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the development of evidence law, to the end of
ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.’ This Symposium is intended to celebrate
the restyled Evidence Rules, which will enhance this lofty and salutary purpose.”).

2090

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 2085

I posit that the practitioners’ intuition is correct. Evidence doctrine does
not ignore probability, economics, and moral theory. Yet, it also does not
allow any of these disciplines to take over. Evidence doctrine is informed by
a preselected, adapted, and integrated set of probabilistic, economic, and
moral ideas, identified here as organizing principles. These principles are
formulated and continually refined by common law courts as they go from
case to case. They have a common goal: implementing people’s substantive
entitlements and liabilities as fairly and as efficiently as possible. The
organizing principles of evidence law thus fit themselves into the conceptual
and operational framework of substantive entitlements and liabilities.
This framework is decidedly second-personal: it conditions the grant of
legal remedies and the imposition of penalties on the presence of authority,
on one side, and accountability, on the other side.25 This framework
authorizes a rightholder to impose punishment on or obtain compensation
from a person who transgressed her entitlement.26 The plaintiff ’s authority
and the defendant’s parallel accountability thus depend on the correctness
of the plaintiff ’s infringement allegation against the defendant. For
example, in order to succeed in a tort suit, a plaintiff must establish that the
defendant carelessly caused her injury. The plaintiff consequently must
adduce evidence identifying her injury, the defendant’s careless action, and
the causal connection between the two. If convincing, this evidence would
establish the plaintiff ’s legal authority over the defendant and make the
defendant accountable to the plaintiff for the amount stipulated by the law.
The defendant, for his part, may present evidence disassociating his actions
from the plaintiff ’s injury or showing that those actions were careful
enough. If convincing, this evidence would make the defendant unaccountable and the plaintiff would then be denied the authority to extract
compensation from the defendant.
This second-personal framework defines the nature of factfinding in the
courts of law. Adjudicative factfinding focuses exclusively on the parties’
authority–accountability relationship and on the story underlying that
specific relationship. For that reason, it assumes the form of a contest

25 See STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT,
AND A CCOUNTABILITY 5-9 (2006).
26 See STEPHEN DARWALL, MORALITY, AUTHORITY, AND L AW: ESSAYS IN SECOND -

PERSONAL ETHICS I 135-39 (2013) (explaining this framework as the difference between an
agent-neutral, or state-of-the-world-regarding, reason for acting and an agent-relative relationship
in which there is authority to demand action second-personally).
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between the plaintiff ’s (or the prosecutor’s) and the defendant’s stories.27
Courts resolve those contests by applying the relative plausibility criterion,
also called “inference to the best explanation.”28 Specifically, they determine
which of the parties’ conflicting stories make the most sense in terms of
coherence, consilience, causality, and evidential support.29 The story that
scores the highest along these dimensions forms the factual base for
ascribing liabilities and entitlements and for awarding remedies.30
Second-personal factfinding is case specific by design: it requires
evidence that reveals the specifics of the parties’ relationship. Without
knowing these specifics, courts would not be able to determine whether the
plaintiff has a valid authoritative demand that makes the defendant
accountable to her. Courts consequently cannot rely on statistical evidence
as their primary information. Because statistical distributions tell nothing
about the plaintiff ’s authority over the defendant and the defendant’s
accountability to the plaintiff, they are second-personally irrelevant.
Factfinders, for example, cannot base a murder conviction upon evidence
showing that the defendant was one of 1000 prisoners, of whom 999
participated in a riot that killed prison guards.31 Statistical distributions,
however, can still play a role as secondary information that helps courts
evaluate case-specific evidence.32 For example, in evaluating case-specific
testimony of an eyewitness, courts may take into account psychological
studies identifying the general rate of eyewitness error.33
27 See Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 604,
612-14 (1994) (analyzing the proper “allocation of ambiguity” between the plaintiff’s and
defendant’s stories that should be applied by a factfinder); Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen,
Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 LAW & PHIL. 223, 229-31 (2008) (arguing that the
decisionmaking “process occurs in two steps: generating potential explanations of the evidence and
then selecting the best explanation from the list of potential ones”).
28 Allen & Stein, supra note 19, at 567-71.
29 Id. at 579.
30 See id. (finding that these dimensions “trump frequentist probability in any individual
case”).
31 This example is borrowed from Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive
Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1192-93 (1979).
32 Cf. Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1076 (1991) (citing
JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON T RIAL 21 (1950)) (explaining how jurors use experience-based
credibility cues in evaluating testimony of witnesses).
33 See, e.g., Smith v. State, 880 A.2d 288, 294-98 (Md. 2005) (invoking statistical incidence
of errors in cross-racial identifications as a reason for quashing conviction of defendants that were
prevented by the trial judge from drawing jurors’ attention to potential unreliability of white
witnesses identifying black suspects as perpetrators). As Ronald Allen and I have observed, courts
also rely on naked statistical evidence in special cases that involve (inter alia) “market-share
liability for defective products, doctors’ liability for patients’ lost chances to recover from illness,
employers’ liability for discriminating against classes of employees, trademark infringers’ liability
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Consider the proverbial Blue Bus company that operates 80% of the
buses in town and that has a competitor, Green Bus, that operates the
remaining 20%.34 A person is injured by an unidentified bus in a hit-and-run
accident that had no witnesses. Under such circumstances, the victim cannot
validly claim that her probability of having been hit by a blue bus was 80%.
Although statistically correct, this claim is not valid from a second-personal
standpoint; all it can show is a distribution of multiple victims randomly hit
by blue and green buses. The victim has no concrete account of the event in
which she, as opposed to another victim, was wronged by a blue, as opposed
to a green, bus. The victim consequently fails to establish her authority over
the Blue Bus company. Nor can she prove that Blue Bus is accountable to
her, as opposed to another victim.35
The second-personal design of evidence doctrine also accounts for the
doctrine’s economics. The doctrine confines factfinders’ inquiries to the
specifics of the parties’ relationship. Due to this confinement, aptly
for consumer confusion, and the election law protection against redistricting manipulations.” Allen
& Stein, supra note 19, at 576.
34 This example draws on Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 58 N.E.2d 754 (Mass. 1945); see also
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 166-70 (2011) (using a similar example
involving cabs in a psychological experiment).
35 Cf. David Enoch et al., Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge, 40
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 197, 202-10 (2012) (using Timothy Williamson’s seminal account of
“sensitivity” to explain the legal system’s rejection of naked statistical evidence) see TIMOTHY
WILLIAMSON, KNOWLEDGE AND I TS LIMITS 147-63 (2000); David Enoch & Talia Fisher,
Sense and “Sensitivity”: Epistemic and Instrumental Approaches to Statistical Evidence, 67 STAN. L.
REV. 557, 573-85 (2015). Arguably, the 80% probability supporting the plaintiff’s allegations
against Blue Bus fails the “sensitivity” test because any addition of relevant evidence—for
example, testimony that drivers working for Green Bus had a drinking party on the day of the
accident—would change that probability quite dramatically. Under such circumstances, the
factfinder’s belief that a blue bus caused the accident would be “insensitive” and hence unjustified
because the factfinder would hold it even when it is factually untrue. The “sensitivity” test plays
an important role in epistemology, see Williamson, supra, at 147-48, and in probability theory, but
it adds very little to the understanding of the law of evidence as a body of rules that facilitate
second-personal factfinding. To see why, take a reasonably sensitive belief in a statistical
generalization that can also be conceptualized as “invariant” following ROBERT NOZICK,
INVARIANCES: THE STRUCTURE OF THE OBJECTIVE WORLD 75-90, 99 (2001). Specifically,
consider an economic expert who testifies in a corporate fraud trial that many CEOs working for
publicly traded companies sacrifice their companies’ long-term interests in their pursuit of
privately advantageous short-term gains. As a strictly statistical proposition, this testimony is
unshakable. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency
Problem, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2003, at 71 (explaining how prevalent executive-compensation
structures induce self-seeking behavior). Under our evidence system, however, it would be
inadmissible either because it is irrelevant or because it can show only the general propensity of
average, as opposed to specific, CEOs. See FED. R. EVID. 402, 404(b). Such evidence fails the
individualization test, see FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 91-106, and as such is incapable of
supporting any second-personal claim against the CEO.
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identified by Lon Fuller as monocentricity,36 courts are neither able nor
authorized to make decisions that promote global welfare-maximization. All
they can do is increase their chances of making an accurate decision in the
case at bar at a socially affordable cost.37 In tune with that goal, the doctrine
strives to make the factfinding system internally cost efficient. To that end,
it sets up rules that minimize the cost of factfinding errors and the cost of
avoiding those errors as a total sum.38 These rules take into account the risk
of error and the value of what a party stands to lose in the event of an
error.39 The greater the expected loss, the higher the level of protection
against error that the party will receive under these rules.40 Whether this
inner efficiency also improves social welfare is a separate macroeconomic
question that the doctrine does not address.
The doctrine’s commitment to case specificity and cost minimization
also defines the extent to which it can implement moral principles. For
example, the doctrine cannot implement the Kantian principle of desert41
while satisfying its case-specificity and cost-minimization goals. Consider
again the prisoners’ riot case that calls for an acquittal of all 1000 prisoners
due to the absence of evidence identifying the crime’s perpetrators
individually. This acquittal violates the desert principle because it
purposefully allows 999 murderers to go unpunished. To avoid this
violation, the court could convict all 1000 prisoners, including the innocent
inmate. Alas, this verdict would also violate the desert principle (along with
Kant’s “categorical imperative”)42 because it deliberately inflicts punishment
on an innocent person.
Evidence doctrine therefore has no choice but to limit its moral
ambition. Fairness and morality are important, but case specificity and cost
minimization are important as well. The doctrine consequently can promote
fairness only within the given framework of the law. As I already explained,
this framework requires courts to make case-specific decisions that minimize
the total cost of error and error avoidance.43 Under these constraints, the
36 See Lon Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 54 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 1, 3-7
(1960) (distinguishing between monocentric and “polycentric” adjudication).
37 Stein, supra note 15, at 428-29, 442.
38 Id. at 443-44.
39 Id. at 429-30.
40 Id.
41 See Don E. Scheid, Kant’s Retributivism, 93 ETHICS 262, 274 (1983) (“To treat an individual
with the respect due him as a human being is to treat him according to his deserts . . . .”).
42 See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 39 (Lewis
White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1959) (1785) (“Act only according to that maxim by which
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”).
43 FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 91-106, 141-43.
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only moral virtue that the doctrine can plausibly promote is “equal best.”44
All it can do is afford every person the maximal feasible protection against
risk of error while equalizing that protection across the board.45
These three principles explain and justify all evidentiary rules that
regulate factfinding in courts46 (except privileges that suppress evidence for
purposes unrelated to factfinding)47. The common law rule that prohibits
courts from basing their decisions on naked statistical evidence realizes the
case-specificity principle.48 The rule suppressing evidence of a person’s
character or propensity does the same (since character and propensity
evidence is nakedly statistical).49 Burdens of proof, civil and criminal,
implement the cost-minimization principle within the framework of equal
best.50 Evidentiary presumptions try to achieve the same goal through
adjustment of the general proof burdens.51 The rule against hearsay
minimizes the cost of error-avoidance while also implementing the
equal-best requirement.52 It does so by systematically suppressing onesided and untestable out-of-court statements that give their proponents an
unfair advantage in the allocation of the risk of error. Rules determining the
admissibility of expert evidence (both Frye53 and Daubert54) pursue cost
minimization (albeit, with varying success).
This understanding of the law of evidence has a number of implications
for policy and scholarship. First and most important, evidentiary rules and
substantive laws are integrated and codependent. The case-specificity
requirement set up by our rules of evidence preserves the second-personal
nature of substantive entitlements and liabilities. Evidentiary rules that
work to achieve cost-minimization facilitate accurate, but cost-conscious,
44
45
46
47

Id. at 172-78, 214-25.
Id.
Id. at 138-40.
Because privileges protect substantive confidentiality entitlements, they are properly
categorized as belonging to substantive law rather than the law of evidence. See John Hart Ely,
The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 724-27 (1974) (attesting that immunities,
which would include evidentiary privileges, belong to substantive law); Jack B. Weinstein, The
Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of Federal Rules of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. REV.
353, 373 (1969) (same).
48 See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 204-07, 238-40 (discussing the law’s preemption of
decisions based on naked statistical evidence).
49 Id. at 183-89.
50 Id. at 143-53.
51 See id. at 222-23 (discussing the role of the burden of proof in the equal-best framework).
52 Id. at 189-96; see also Stein, supra note 15, at 444-50 (discussing the risks addressed by the
hearsay rule).
53 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
54 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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ascertainment of substantive liabilities and entitlements. Finally, rules of
evidence that form the equal-best principle make sure that courts do not
assign substantive liabilities and entitlements arbitrarily or through bias.
The three principles of the law of evidence also impose limits on the
claims that scholars can plausibly make about evidentiary rules. As far as
normative theory is concerned, scholars may call for a revision and
replacement of evidentiary rules that do not function properly in promoting
case specificity, cost minimization, or equal best. From a descriptive
standpoint, scholars may consider whether any of the three principles
requires reformulation and refinement to produce a more accurate account
of the law of evidence. Scholarly endeavors that go along these paths
perceive legal doctrine as a system of interconnected evidentiary,
procedural, and substantive rules that define people’s entitlements and
liabilities. This integrated understanding of the law represents the “New
Doctrinalism.”
What scholars cannot plausibly do is promote an evidentiary reform that
parts company with the three principles of the law of evidence. Any such
reform will bring about distortions in the legal system. Abolition of the
rules associated with the case-specificity principle would unravel the secondpersonal structure of the substantive entitlements and liabilities. Repealing
the rules that promote cost minimization is bound to create discrepancies
between the courts’ factfinding efforts and the value of the underlying
substantive entitlements and liabilities. Doing away with the equal-best
principle would allow courts to use whim and bias in allocating the risk of
error between the parties.
My methodological injunction does not ban wholesale reform proposals
that purport to remodel our entire legal system together with the three
evidentiary principles. More often than not, such proposals are unrealistic
and overambitious, but they can be normatively plausible, and I am not
criticizing them in this Article. I argue against theories of evidence that
make no attempt to understand our legal system from the perspective of an
informed insider who sees the connections between the system’s different
rules and what those rules collectively aim to achieve. These theories
anomalously purport to remodel our system of evidence while holding the
substantive law constant. In what follows, I call this wrong-headed
methodology “antidoctrinalism.” In Parts II, III, and IV below, I
demonstrate how antidoctrinalism plagues a number of economic,
probabilistic, and moral theories of evidence that otherwise appear
attractive.
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II. ECONOMIC ANTIDOCTRINALISM
The most recent and by far most salient example of economic
antidoctrinalism in the area of evidence is Louis Kaplow’s ambitious
proposal to redesign the burden of proof.55 Kaplow argues that the burden
of proof doctrine is fundamentally flawed in that it has “almost nothing to
do with what matters for society.”56 Probability thresholds set by this
doctrine—“preponderance,” “clear and convincing,” and “beyond a
reasonable doubt”57—represent different levels of accuracy for factual
findings. For civil actions, preponderance of the evidence will suffice.58 For
findings that lead to a deprivation of the defendant’s civil right, the law
normally requires clear and convincing evidence.59 Criminal prosecutors will
only obtain conviction when the defendant’s guilt is proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.60 According to Kaplow, this pursuit of “accuracy ex post”
is futile because it has no effect upon actors’ primary behavior.61 Based on
this observation, Kaplow calls on lawmakers to do away with accuracy ex
post.62 He recommends that lawmakers replace the burden of proof doctrine
with factfinding mechanisms that incentivize socially desirable conduct.
To operationalize this idea, Kaplow develops a novel legal mechanism
that uses “evidence thresholds.”63 Evidence that goes into Kaplow’s
thresholds integrates information about the systemic effects of the relevant
primary activity: harmful, socially useful, and benign.64 This evidence
associates different activities with different concentrations of harm and
benefit. Some of those concentrations yield a socially negative tradeoff,
others do not. Based on this evidence, the legal system should penalize
activities associated with the undesirable concentrations of harm versus
benefit.65 Probabilities upon which actors will receive those penalties will
vary as well. When the harm in the mix predominates, the system will
decrease the probability upon which courts can find a person responsible for
55
56
57
58
59

See generally Kaplow, supra note 18.
Id. at 789.
Id. at 742-44.
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 221-23.
Id. at 152-53 (“[C]laims and contentions that require proof by clear and convincing
evidence include allegations of fraud and deprivations of civil liberties.”).
60 Id. at 148-51.
61 See Kaplow, supra note 18, at 784-89 (arguing that his proposed proof system is more finely
tuned to social welfare because of its emphasis on factor analysis as opposed to ex post accuracy).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 756-62.
64 Id. at 757.
65 Id.
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the underlying misconduct and the ensuing harm.66 Conversely, as the harm
in the mix subsides, the probability that courts will require for finding the
actor liable will get higher.67 Kaplow argues that these multiple rules
outperform the conventional burden of proof doctrine at promoting social
utility.68
From a purely economic standpoint, Kaplow’s model is normatively
appealing (subject to the cost problem that he addresses, but does not
completely resolve).69 The economic standpoint, however, is too abstract. It
pays no regard to the structure and substance of our legal system. First and
most importantly, Kaplow ignores the second-personal nature of legal
entitlements and liabilities. Under his model, instead of relying on the
authority–accountability relationship between individual plaintiffs and
defendants, courts determine people’s liabilities and entitlements on the
basis of general social facts. These social facts are statistical distributions
unrelated to the parties’ concrete behavior. Decisions that courts would
make under Kaplow’s model would consequently violate the case-specificity
principle.
This model also violates the equal-best principle. It does so by
systematically discriminating against defendants whose activities fall into
the socially disfavored concentrations of benefit versus harm. Under
Kaplow’s model, the level of protection against error that a person receives
does not depend on whether she is a civil or criminal defendant and on the
value of the entitlement that she might undeservedly lose in court. Instead,
it depends on how good or bad the social consequences of a person’s actions
are in a statistical sense.
Kaplow’s model is also completely unrelated to the conventional
principle of cost minimization. This model incorporates a new mechanism
of entitlements and liabilities that tracks statistical concentrations of harms
versus benefits.70 This mechanism tries to accomplish a whole lot more than
reconfigure the burden-of-proof doctrine. Implementing it would redesign
our entire legal system. Presently, whether an actor is liable or not depends
on whether his conduct aligns with the requisite legal rule or standard. This
factual question, in turn, depends on whether the misconduct allegation
against the actor is sufficiently probable. When the allegation is criminal, its

66
67
68
69

Id.
Id.
Id. at 782-86.
See Allen & Stein, supra note 19, at 563-65, 580-83 (critiquing Kaplow’s theory on a
number of bases, including its enormous informational costs).
70 Kaplow, supra note 18, at 756-61 (explaining the “evidence thresholds” framework).

2098

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 163: 2085

probability must be high enough to eliminate “all reasonable doubt.”71 And
when the alleged misconduct is civil, as in tort or contract cases, it must be
“more probable than not”72 (and in some special cases it must be verified by
“clear and convincing evidence”)73. This conventional system minimizes the
cost of adjudicative errors and the cost of accuracy as a total sum.74
Under Kaplow’s system, on the other hand, whether an actor should be
liable or not depends on the statistical zone into which her conduct falls.
Each statistical zone represents a discrete concentration of harms and
benefits: positive (when the benefits are greater than the harms), negative
(when the harms are greater than the benefits), or neutral (when the harms
and the benefits are equal).75 When the zone into which the actor’s conduct
falls is neutral, evidence that her specific conduct was harmful must show
preponderance. Harm originating from the actor’s conduct must consequently
be more probable than not.76 When the zone is positive, the requisite
evidence must achieve a high degree of probability: somewhere between
clear and convincing and beyond a reasonable doubt.77 And when the zone is
negative, the requisite evidence needs to show probability below these levels
and, in appropriate cases, even below preponderance.78 This Bayesian
insight79 reveals the enormous cost that society incurs by requiring
prosecutors to prove criminal accusations beyond a reasonable doubt.80
According to Kaplow, the “beyond reasonable doubt standard” is inimical to
social welfare.81 He is not the first to make that accusation.82
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
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79

FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 148-51, 178-83.
Id. at 124-33.
Id. at 152-53.
Id. at 141-43.
Kaplow, supra note 18, at 756-62.
Id. at 763-68.
Id.
Id.
See Allen & Stein, supra note 19, at 584-88 (explaining and criticizing the Bayesian
rationale of Kaplow’s “evidence thresholds” system); see also Louis Kaplow, Likelihood Ratio Tests
and Legal Decision Rules, 16 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 1 (2014) (explaining Bayesian foundations of
proposed method for making legal decisions).
80 Kaplow, supra note 18, at 744 (“[S]tricter proof burdens can, in plausible settings, increase
rather than decrease the number of false convictions, and the presence of higher social costs of
sanctions likewise has ambiguous implications regarding whether the proof burden should be
higher or lower.”); see also id. at 790-91.
81 Id. at 744, 790-91.
82 See generally Larry Laudan, Is Reasonable Doubt Reasonable?, 9 LEGAL THEORY 295 (2003)
(arguing that the proof beyond a reasonable doubt requirement is dysfunctional); Larry Laudan, Is
it Finally Time to Put ‘Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt’ Out to Pasture? (Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Series No. 194, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1815321 (criticizing the
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Kaplow’s system therefore represents an entirely new, welfare-driven,
substantive law. Unlike the conventional doctrine that focuses upon
evidence and how to use it in order to minimize the overall cost of
adjudicative error and error avoidance, this system fits itself into a big
picture of social welfare, which it tries to maximize directly.83 This direct
approach to welfare maximization eliminates the doctrinal structures that
try to improve social welfare indirectly through the familiar mechanisms of
rights, duties, liabilities, and burdens of proof. Implementing it would
substitute our legal system with a different one.
Kaplow’s suggestion that our system is actually broken and needs to be
fixed is doubtful. Kaplow complains that the system ignores concentrations
of harm versus benefit and their importance. My view of the system is more
charitable. As Ronald Allen and I have shown in a recent work,
concentrations of harm versus benefit animate our system’s substantive rules
of civil and criminal liability.84 Kaplow criticizes the burden of proof
doctrine for being oblivious to these concentrations and their implications
for social welfare, but this critique pays no regard to the substantive rules of
tort, contract, and criminal liability that the doctrine was set up to
implement. Our burden of proof rules operate in tandem with the
substantive rules of liability. They do so by setting up the probability
thresholds that courts use in ascertaining the presence of characteristics that
make a person’s conduct prohibited (and hence socially undesirable) or
permitted (and hence socially desirable or neutral). Those thresholds
determine the level of enforcement for liability rules and where the risk of
erroneous enforcement should fall.85 Kaplow pays no attention to this
synergy. He analyzes the burden of proof doctrine as a freestanding set of
rules and, unsurprisingly, produces a descriptively distorted account of the
doctrine.

wrongful conviction versus wrongful acquittal tradeoff contemplated by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt standard).
83 See Allen & Stein, supra note 19, at 588-93 ( juxtaposing Kaplow’s direct approach to
welfare maximization against the indirect approach taken by positive law).
84 Id.
85 These rules still have certain undesirable effects on actors’ primary behavior. See generally
Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distortionary Effect of Evidence on Primary Behavior, 124
HARV. L. REV. 518 (2010) (demonstrating that evidentiary motivations lead actors to engage in
“socially suboptimal behavior when doing so is likely to increase their chances of prevailing in
court”).
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III. PROBABILISTIC ANTIDOCTRINALISM
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky are renowned psychologists and
behavioral economists,86 who claim to have uncovered systematic flaws in
people’s evaluations of probability. One of their most famous claims
criticizes the factfinding method followed by our courts of law. This claim
originates from the robust experiment known as “Blue Cab.”87
Kahneman, Tversky, and their collaborators told factfinders about a hitand-run accident that occurred at night in a city in which 85% of cabs were
blue and 15% were green. They also told the factfinders that the hit-and-run
victim filed a lawsuit against the companies operating those cabs—identified
respectively as “Blue Cab” and “Green Cab”—and that an eyewitness
testified in the ensuing trial that the cab that hit the victim was green.
Another piece of information that the factfinders received concerned a
rather unusual procedure that took place at this trial. The experimenters
told the participants that “[the judge] tested the witness’ ability to
distinguish between Blue and Green cabs under nighttime visibility
conditions [and] found that the witness was able to identify each color
correctly about 80% of the time but confused it with the other color about
20% of the time.”88 Based on this information, factfinders estimated that the
probability that a green cab hit the victim was 0.8.89 Remarkably, this
assessment squarely aligns with the preponderance of the evidence
requirement for civil suits.
Under Bayes’ Theorem, however, things are markedly different. The
prior odds that the responsible cab was green as opposed to blue,
P(G)/P(B), equaled 0.15/0.85. To calculate the posterior odds,
P(G|W)/P(B|W), with W denoting the credibility of the witness, these
odds had to be multiplied by the likelihood ratio. This ratio is equal to the
odds attaching to the scenario in which the witness identified the cab’s color
correctly, rather than incorrectly: P(W|G)/P(W|B). The posterior odds
consequently equaled (0.15 × 0.8)/(0.85 × 0.2)—that is, 12/17. The
probability that the victim’s allegation against the Green Cab is true thus
amounted to 12/(17 + 12) or 0.41—far below the “preponderance of the
86 See generally Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral
Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003) (recounting Kahneman’s Noble Prize lecture
summarizing his work with the late Amos Tversky).
87 KAHNEMAN, supra note 34, at 166-70 (presenting the “Blue Cab” experiment); see also
Maya Bar-Hillel, The Base-Rate Fallacy in Probability Judgments, 44 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 211,
211-12 (1980) (same).
88 See Bar-Hillel, supra note 87, at 211-12.
89 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 34, at 167.
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evidence standard” (> 0.5) that applies in civil litigation. Based on this
insight, Kahneman, Tversky, and their collaborators claimed to have
established a mismatch between the factfinders’ cognition and the real
probability.90
Similarly to Kaplow’s abstract model of the burden of proof, this
argument is strikingly antidoctrinal. Begin with the second-personal
framework of the trial. Under that framework, the fact that 85% of the cabs
in town are blue rather than green is of no consequence. Whether the
defendant’s cab hit the plaintiff has nothing to do with that statistical
distribution. Correspondingly, the case-specificity principle holds that
factfinders should disregard this piece of information.
What is of consequence is the witness who saw the accident and who
says that the cab that hit the victim was green. The fact that the witness
correctly identifies cab colors 80% of the time is also relevant. As I already
explained, factfinders can use such evidence as second-order information in
assessing the credibility of the primary evidence (the witness’s testimony).
The distribution of cabs in town, on the other hand, cannot be used as
credibility evidence because an ordinary person can tell green from blue
even when she is accustomed to seeing one green cab and many blue cabs.
The plaintiff ’s case-specific story, corroborated by the eyewitness,
consequently wins the plausibility contest. In numerical terms, this story
has an 80% probability of being true, precisely as estimated by the
factfinders.
For Kahneman, Tversky, and their collaborators, the “case-specificity”
principle and the whole idea of second-personal factfinding make no sense.
The fact that participants in their “Blue Cab” experiment followed an
established legal doctrine is equally immaterial. The only thing that
mattered was the Bayes’ Theorem violation. For Kahneman, Tversky, and
other behavioral economists, a person can only be rational when she follows
that theorem. When a person violates that theorem, she is irrational, by
definition.
This narrow understanding of probabilistic rationality brushes aside the
causative probability system that underlies the case-specificity principle.91
As a normative matter, the Blue Cab case can be analyzed under two
distinct analytical frameworks: mathematical and causative.92 The
mathematical framework uses Bayes’ Theorem, whose application gives the
90
91

Id.
See Alex Stein, The Flawed Probabilistic Foundation of Law and Economics, 105 NW. U. L.
REV. 199, 200-04 (2011).
92 Id. at 253-56.
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victim’s case a 0.41 probability (if we ignore some additional problems with
the “Blue Cab” experiment). This probability represents the errant cab’s
chances of being green rather than blue, with a cab-identifying witness
scoring 80 out of 100 on similar identifications in a town in which 85% of
the cabs are blue and 15% are green. The causative framework, on the other
hand, yields an altogether different result, close to the mathematical
probability of the witness’s accuracy (0.8). Under this framework, an event’s
probability corresponds to the quantum and variety of the evidence that
confirms the event’s occurrence while eliminating rival scenarios.93 This
qualitative criterion separates causative probability and the case-specific
stories to which it attaches from the mathematical calculus of chances.94
Under this criterion, the eyewitness’s testimony that the errant cab was
green was credible enough to rule out the “errant blue cab” scenario as
causatively implausible. On the other hand, the distribution of blue and
green cabs in the given town had no proven effect on the eyewitness’s
capacity to tell blue from green. The eyewitness’s testimony consequently
overrides the cab-color statistics.
Remarkably, Kahneman, Tversky, and their collaborators do not even say
what the legal system would gain if factfinders were to follow Bayes’
Theorem. To find out, consider one hundred cases similar to the “Blue Cab”
scenario and assume that factfinders abandon the case-specificity principle
and follow Bayes’ Theorem instead. They determine that the suit’s
probability in each case equals 0.41 and dismiss each and every of the one
hundred suits for failure to establish preponderance. Contrary to the
implicit assumption of Kahneman, Tversky, and other behavioral
economists, the factfinders would not deliver 59 correct decisions out of 100.
Instead, they would deliver only 20 correct decisions and 80 erroneous
verdicts. Their rate of errors would track the number of color
misidentifications by the eyewitness. As I already explained, this number
will remain unaffected by the fact that 85% of the cabs in town are blue and
only 15% are green. For that reason, if factfinders were to apply Bayes’
Theorem in violation of the case-specificity requirement, they would
increase the cost of error instead of decreasing it.95
The cost-minimization principle thus also requires factfinders to ignore
the cab-color statistic and base their decisions on the eyewitness’s testimony
93
94
95

Id. at 243-46.
Id. at 235-46.
For further critique of Tversky and Kahneman’s claim that people systematically make
probabilistically irrational decisions, see Alex Stein, Are People Probabilistically Challenged?, 111
MICH. L. REV. 855 (2013) (book review).
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alone. The cab-color statistic can only increase, rather then decrease, the
prospect of error in the factfinders’ decision because it has no causal
connection to the plaintiff ’s story. The fact that Green Cab owns only 150
out of 1000 cabs in town does not integrate in any causally meaningful way
with the eyewitness’s testimony: “I saw the cab that injured the plaintiff,
and it was green.” Behavioral economists call the factfinders’ decision for
the plaintiff a “base rate neglect,” but we could equally see it as according
overriding power to evidence of causes and effects. Evidence doctrine
systematically prefers causative evidence to naked statistics because it aims
at getting courts closer to the truth. We live in a world of causes and effects.
Consider the disruption that our criminal justice system would endure if
it cared about base rates. Take a sophisticated crime—say, counterfeiting
United States currency—that only one person out of a million can
successfully carry out. Assume that two independent eyewitnesses identify
Rick as a successful counterfeiter. Assume further that each of those
witnesses was tested for credibility and, as in the “Blue Cab” scenario, was
found to give a completely truthful description of what she saw 80% of the
time. The two witnesses thus give factfinders a very high aggregated
probability of the defendant’s guilt: 0.96 [0.8+0.8-(0.8x0.8)]. Assume that
this probability satisfies the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.
At this point, the defendant asks the factfinders to factor in the
1/1,000,000 base rate, which should lead to his immediate acquittal. The
prosecutor protests. She says that with this base rate any criminal trial
would be a waste of time and resources, to which the defendant responds,
“This is exactly my point. Can I go now?” Fortunately for all of us, the
defendant cannot go scot-free. Our legal system does not allow factfinders
to rely on base rates that have no causal connection to case-specific
evidence.96
IV. MORAL ANTIDOCTRINALISM
Ronald Dworkin’s important essay, Principle, Policy, Procedure, originally
appeared in the Festschrift honoring the late Sir Rupert Cross, one of the

96 Consider in this connection Hume’s criticism of the base-rate neglect that appears in his
famous essay on miracles. DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES: CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 109-31 (P.H. Nidditch ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 3d ed. 1975) (1777). Critically, although Hume’s distrust of miracle-tellers alludes to general
probability, what makes those witnesses untrustworthy are the laws of nature rather than statistical
distributions. For a superb analysis of Hume’s essay, see David Owen, Hume Versus Price on
Miracles and Prior Probabilities: Testimony and the Bayesian Calculation, 37 PHIL. Q. 187 (1987).
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world’s finest doctrinal scholars of evidence.97 This essay was nonetheless
theoretical, rather than doctrinal, and it also was Dworkin’s first and only
contribution to the field of evidence.98 The newcomer status did not prevent
Dworkin from spotting and attempting to resolve one of the field’s most
fundamental questions: What is the right way to deal with the risk of error
in factfinding?99
To resolve this question, Dworkin distinguished between two kinds of
injustice: accidental and deliberate.100 Accidental injustice occurs when a
person’s entitlement—say, the right to be cleared of criminal charges or
allegations of negligence—deserves to be upheld, but the court denies that
entitlement to the person based on the available evidence.101 The available
evidence unequivocally identifies the person as guilty even though he is
factually innocent. The gap between the evidence and the true facts, for
which the court is not accountable, makes the resulting injustice accidental
rather than deliberate. The court’s decision does not purport to convict a
person identified by the evidence as actually or possibly innocent.102
Arguably, Dworkin’s distinction is untidy because making the adjudicative
system more meticulous about factfinding could narrow the gap between the
evidence and the truth. For Dworkin, however, this objection is beside the
point because it is not strong enough to recharacterize an accidental act of
injustice that does not target any specific individual for a deliberate denial
of right. Under Dworkin’s theory, setting up a cost-conscious system of
adjudication that accidentally denies people their dues is morally justified.103
Dworkin explains that societal resources are scarce and there is no
overriding moral imperative which demands their channeling into court
proceedings, as opposed to health, education, highways, border patrol, and
other social amenities. Citizens benefiting from those amenities may
occasionally be harmed by the underfunded system of adjudication. This
97 Ronald Dworkin, Principle, Policy, Procedure, in CRIME, PROOF AND PUNISHMENT:
ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF SIR RUPERT CROSS 193-225 (Colin Tapper ed., 1981).
98 RONALD A. D WORKIN, Principle, Policy, Procedure, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72-103
(1985).
99 See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 12-25 (arguing that allocation of the risk of error is a
principal objective of evidence law). This argument was first made in Alex Stein, The Law of
Evidence and the Problem of Risk Distribution (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of London) (on file with London University Senate) and subsequently developed in
Alex Stein, The Refoundation of Evidence Law, 9 CAN. J. LAW & JURISPRUDENCE 279 (1996).
100 DWORKIN, supra note 98, at 79-88.
101 Id. at 84-85.
102 Id.
103 Id.
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system may accidentally work against a person by unintentionally producing
an erroneous decision that deprives her of her legal entitlement. Such an
outcome, as regrettable as it may be, is morally indistinguishable from a
traffic accident resulting from poor maintenance of the road.104
According to Dworkin, deliberate injustice is different.105 Rather than
being impersonal, this injustice is always directed against a known victim.106
Consider a criminal case in which the evidence casts strong suspicion on the
defendant but also shows that he may have not committed the alleged
crime. In any such case, if the court decides to ignore the exonerating
potential of the evidence and deliver a guilty verdict, it would produce
deliberate injustice.107
Consider now a tort action in which a quadriplegic plaintiff blames his
injury on a motorcycle crash that, according to him, resulted from his
motorcycle’s malfunctioning suspension system.108 The plaintiff asks the
court to find the motorcycle’s manufacturer responsible for his injury. To
prove his allegation, the plaintiff calls an accident expert to testify about
fifty similar accidents and about the fact that, after these accidents, the
manufacturer developed a new and safer motorcycle model.109 The court
decides to suppress this evidence. Other evidence does not make the
plaintiff ’s case more probable than not, and the jury rules for the defendant.
Here, too, the injustice suffered by the plaintiff is deliberate rather than
accidental because the evidence suppressed by the court could prove the
alleged motorcycle defect. As Bentham famously put it, when you exclude
such probative evidence, “you exclude justice.”110
Both of my examples involve a sacrifice of a person’s actual or potential
entitlement for some general societal good. In the criminal case, the court
overrides a reasonable doubt for a reason: the alternative—acquittal of a
person who likely committed the alleged crime—would pose a danger to
society. In the tort action, the court suppresses evidence of the new
motorcycle design because its admission might discourage manufacturers
from making similar improvements. Under Dworkin’s theory, neither of
those sacrifices is justified because they force the individual to pay more
than she should under the general utilitarian tradeoff underlying our
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

Id. at 84-87.
Id.
Id.
Id.
This example draws on Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984).
See id. at 468.
5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE: SPECIALLY APPLIED
TO ENGLISH PRACTICE 1 (Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1995) (1827).
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imperfect—but affordable—system of adjudication and its accidental errors.
Those sacrifices are morally wrong because they are deliberate but not only
for that reason. The fact that those sacrifices are deliberately imposed on an
individual person also places them outside the permitted scope of the
courts’ random errors. The person who endures the sacrifice pays an extra
tax on top of the courts’ accidental errors to which she and everyone else are
exposed. This extra tax violates Dworkin’s fundamental principle: the state’s
duty to treat individuals with equal concern and respect.111
This principle is antidoctrinal. It pays no regard to the second-personal
framework of substantive entitlements and liabilities within which parties
raise competing claims of authority and accountability. These claims play a
zero-sum game against each other. As under Hohfeld’s system of jural
relations,112 when a plaintiff provides enough evidence to establish his legal
authority over the defendant, the defendant becomes accountable to the
plaintiff.113 Conversely, when the defendant’s evidence undermines the
plaintiff ’s claim of authority, it establishes the defendant’s unaccountability.
For that reason, when a criminal court finds a reasonable doubt that
overrides the probability of the defendant’s guilt and mandates his acquittal,
it deliberately sacrifices the interests of crime victims, actual and potential.
These victims consequently acquire a viable claim that they are as entitled
as the defendant to equal concern and respect.
Turning to my second example, if the court were to allow the injured
plaintiff to adduce the proffered evidence of subsequent remedial measures,
it would expose the motorcycle’s manufacturer to the risk of error. The
manufacturer’s safety improvement may not have originated from its
acknowledgement of a defect in the motorcycle’s previous model.
Factfinders nonetheless might interpret it as an implied admission that the
plaintiff ’s motorcycle had a defective suspension system. This decision
would wrongfully establish the manufacturer’s accountability to the
plaintiff. The manufacturer, of course, will object to that deliberate sacrifice.
Specifically, the manufacturer will submit that it, too, deserves equal
concern and respect.
The crime victims’ and the manufacturer’s demands for equal concern
and respect create a stalemate that renders Dworkin’s model inoperative.
This stalemate is not accidental. Adjudication that takes place under
111
112

DWORKIN, supra note 98, at 84-87.
See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL C ONCEPTIONS AS
APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 11-31 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919) (defining and
systematizing jural relations).
113 DARWALL, supra note 26, at 135-39.
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conditions of uncertainty inevitably causes moral injustice to one party or
another.114 Dworkin’s model cannot protect one party against moral injustice
without inflicting a similar injustice on her opponent.115
This structural constraint explains the cost-minimization principle and
its comprehensive adoption by our legal system. The cost-minimization
principle authorizes courts to convict defendants on a high probability of
guilt that need not completely rule out the possibility of innocence. The
cost-minimization principle also justifies the suppression of subsequent
remedial measures. As far as implied admissions are concerned, such
evidence cuts both ways. At the same time, allowing courts to use it would
interfere with manufacturers’ businesses and discourage them from
introducing safety improvements. Dworkin’s attempt at insulating our
evidence system from cost–benefit calculations therefore falls apart. Our
system can afford litigants no special protection against risk of error. All it
can do is minimize the total cost of errors and error avoidance while
equalizing the protection against errors across criminal defendants and
parties to civil suits.116
CONCLUSION
My mentor, William Twining, posited that “healthy discourse involves a
constant interaction between relative generality and relative particularity.”117
Antidoctrinal theories of law, both critical and constructive, involve no such
interactions. These theories proceed from abstract normative premises—
moral, economic, epistemological, and probabilistic—from which they
develop top-down criticism and recommendations in the hopes to advance
the understanding of the law and guide its reform. These theories, however,
do not take doctrine and doctrinal practice seriously. For them, doctrine is
merely a compilation of rudimentary meanings of relevant legal rules. This
methodological standpoint ignores the rules’ synergies, structural
interdependence, and organizing ideas. Antidoctrinal theories thus can
develop valuable insights only in the areas of morality, economics,
epistemology, and probability. They offer no such insights for the law.
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